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cuit's reasoning is sound as applied to a small, underground mine, such
as Sink's, where the operator could refuse inspection.49 However, in the
case of a larger surface mine, the Act's injunction provision might not
protect adequately an operator's privacy since an inspector could enter
the mine and inspect without challenge. 0
In upholding warrantless inspections of Sink's mine, the Fourth Cir-
cuit issued a broad interpretation of the Mine Safety Act's coverage. 1
The court's ruling makes any coal mining operation, no matter how
small, subject to warrantless inspection under section 813.52 The Fourth
Circuit's holding is in accord with decisions of other circuits which con-
sistently have upheld warrantless section 813 inspections of pervasively
regulated industries where an overriding federal interest in miner safety
exists and where the government abides by the Mine Safety Act's in-
spection restrictions.' One court has held that warrantless section 813
inspections were unconstitutional when applied to a small, family-oper-
ated decorative rock operation." The court found that the decorative
rock business was not pervasively regulated, and that the operator did
not impliedly consent to inspections of his quarry.5
JAMES REESE SHOEMAKER
VII. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Commencement Requirements for an Equitable Action Under
the ADEA
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' prohibits
covered employers,2 labor organizations and employment agencies from
discriminating against a person between the ages of forty and seventy
note 11 supra. The regulation was a tenuous safeguard, since it was subject to repeal at any
time. See id.
'" See 614 F.2d at 37; note 37 supra.
" See note 36 supra.
' See id. But see text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
See 614 F.2d at 39.
See note 28 supra.
5 Marshall v. Wait, No. 78-2345, 160-61 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1980). The Wait court did not
rule that § 813 was unconstitutional on its face, nor did it disagree with the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Sink. Id. at 159-60.
See 614 F.2d at 39.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
2 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applies to all employers who
employ 25 or more employees, including executives and supervisors, for 20 or more weeks
in the current or preceding calendar years. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
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years on the basis of age.' If an employer violates the ADEA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 or an aggrieved in-
dividual' may file an action in federal court for legal and equitable relief.8
Section 7(e) of the ADEA establishes the statute of limitations for ac-
tions brought under the ADEA.7 Section 7(e) incorporates section 6 of
the Portal-to-Portal Act,' which requires that a suit must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrued, or be forever barred.'
In the case of willful violations, the limitations period is three years.10
' 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. 1978). The purpose of the ADEA is to alleviate serious
economic and psychological suffering of persons within the ages of 40 and 70 caused by
unreasonable prejudice and job discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
-, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214. Courts have held that the
ADEA is remedial legislation and should be interpreted liberally to effectuate the congres-
sional purpose of ending age discrimination in employment. See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539
F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), affd, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975).
Where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of a particular business, however, an employer's discriminatory actions
toward a person bewteen the ages of 40 and 70 may not be unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1976); see, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (for safety reasons, carrier allowed to impose hiring cutoff at
age 35). See generally Comment, Recent Developments in Age Discrimination, 17 AM. Bus.
L.J. 363, 364-65 (1980).
' Originally, Congress charged the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) with administering
and enforcing the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(a),(b) (1976). Effective July 1, 1979, however, age
discrimination jurisdiction was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978).
' 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976).
6 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); see text accompanying notes 12-15 infra.
' 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (Supp. 1978). Congress recognized that only § 6 and § 10 of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255 & 259 (1976), applied to the ADEA for statute of
limitations purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (Supp. 1978).
8 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). For background information regarding the Portal-to-Portal
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976), see Hodgson v. Katz & Besthoff, #38, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1193, 1195-96 (W.D. La. 1973).
9 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). The 1978 amendments to the ADEA provide for the short-
term tolling of the statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (Supp. 1978). Before the EEOC
can bring a suit seeking enforcement, it must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory prac-
tices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
Congress determined that the statute of limitations will be tolled while the EEOC attempts
to secure the employer's voluntary compliance with the ADEA for a period of up to one
year. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (Supp. 1978). The tolling of the statute begins when the EEOC
states in a letter to the prospective defendant that it is prepared to commence conciliation
efforts. See H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS. 504, 534.
10 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). Recent court decisions have construed virtually every Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) violation to be a willful violation subject to the three year
statute of limitations. See 1 W. & M. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 241-42 (1979). Courts differ slightly, however, in their interpretation of
"willful". Compare Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (employer's action willful if knows FLSA applies, even if
doesn't know actions violate FLSA) with Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,
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To determine when an action commences for statute of limitations
purposes under the ADEA, a grievant or the EEOC must refer to the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)n incorporated into
the ADEA. Section 7(b) of the ADEA specifically incorporates sections
16 and 17 of the FLSA into the ADEA. 2 The EEOC may obtain legal
relief for a violation of the ADEA in the form of unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid overtime wages, and liquidated damages 3 under section 16(c) of
the FLSA." Section 17 of the FLSA authorizes the EEOC to seek equita-
461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (employer's action willful if aware
of appreciable possibility that he may be subject to FLSA's requirements and fails to take
steps reasonably calculated to resolve doubt). See generally Sheeder, Procedural Complex-
ity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. An Age-Old Problem, 18 DuQ. L. REV.
241, 244-45 (1980).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The FLSA was designed to prevent the production of
goods under conditions detrimental to the maintenance of minimum standards of living
necessary for the health and general well-being of individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1976); see
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
2 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Section 7(b) of the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies and procedures provided in Sections 11(b), 16 (except for subsec-
tion 16(a) thereof), and 17 of the FLSA." Id.
,I 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976). Under the FLSA, courts must award liquidated damages
automatically upon proof of a violation of § 16, unless the employer is able to show a good
faith belief that his acts were not in violation of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976); see Mc-
Clanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1971). Even if the employer is able to
show a good faith belief that his acts did not violate the FLSA, courts have the discretion to
award liquidated damages up to the amount of unpaid wages due to the employee. Id. See
generally Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal Pay Act Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REV. 328,
347-53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Richards]. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that courts
may grant liquidated damages only upon proof of a willful violation in actions brought under
the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). See generally Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47, 71-80 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. 1978). As originally enacted, § 16(c) provided that the Wage
and Hour Administration could bring an action for back wages upon an employee's request,
but only in cases not involving novel questions of law. See S. REP. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. -, reprinted in [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 2241, 2272. Congress' amendment to § 17
in 1961 gave the Secretary the right to independently bring an action for injunctive and
monetary relief and thereby severely decreased the utility of a § 16(c) action. Hodgson v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 532 (3d Cir. 1971); see note 15 infra. In 1974, however, Con-
gress amended § 16(c) to authorize the Secretary to bring suit to recover, in addition to un-
paid minimum wages or overtime compensation, an equal amount of liquidated damages.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 77; see H.C. REP. No. 93-953, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2845, 2850. Congress also deleted the requirement
that an employee request the Secretary to bring a § 16(c) action and eliminated the provi-
sion prohibiting an action involving a novel issue of law. Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 77.
Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides that employees may bring suit for recovery of un-
paid wages or overtime compensation plus liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C § 216(b) (Supp.
1978). The right of an employee to bring an action under § 16(b) is terminated when the
EEOC files a complaint under § 16(c) or § 17 of the FLSA. Id.; see S. REP. No. 145, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. - , reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620, 1658-59.
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ble relief in federal district courts to enjoin the employer from
withholding back wages and from committing future violations."5
Congress has expressly recognized that the EEOC commences a sec-
tion 16(c) action for legal relief on the date the EEOC files a complaint
naming a party plaintiff.6 If the EEOC does not name the plaintiff on the
complaint, section 16(c) states that the EEOC commences the action on
the subsequent day on which the EEOC adds the plaintiff's name as a
party plaintiff. 7 Unlike section 16, section 17 does not expressly indicate
whether the EEOC must name the represented individuals on the com-
plaint before a court will consider a defendant to have formally com-
menced a suit for equitable relief. 8
In EEOC v. Gilbarco, Inc., the Fourth Circuit recently considered
which formal requirements the EEOC must meet to commence a section
17 action within the statute of limitations." The Fourth Circuit held that
the EEOC commences an action for equitable relief under the ADEA
when the EEOC files the complaint rather than upon the EEOC's subse-
quent act of naming the individuals represented in the proceeding.2'
In Gilbarco, the employer terminated the employment of a num-
ber of workers between late February and early June of 1973. The
Secretary of Labor (Secretary)3 investigated the employer's action and
on February 11, 1976, filed a complaint against the employer to enforce
the rights of twenty-five employees that the employer allegedly dis-
criminated against on the basis of their age.' The Secretary filed the
, 29 U.S.C § 217 (Supp. 1978). Congress amended § 17 in 1961, giving the Secretary the
right to bring equitable actions to recover unpaid wages and overtime compensation, in ad-
dition to injunctive relief. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, §
12, 75 Stat. 74; see Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 532 (3d Cir. 1971). Congress
gave the Secretary the right to obtain unpaid wages and overtime compensation under a §
17 action, independent of the "employee request" requirement of § 16(c), in order that he
might protect not only an employee's private individual rights but also the public interest.
See S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. -, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1620, 1658-59. Congress was well aware that, in many instances, employees were
reluctant to bring direct wage and hour actions against their employers for fear of subse-
quent retaliation. Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. 1978).
17 !d
18 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976).
615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id at 987-91.
Id. at 987.
Id at 989 n.2; see Brief for Appellee at 2. EEOC v. Gilbarco, Inc., 615 F.2d 985 (4th
Cir. 1980).
1 The duty of administering and enforcing the ADEA was not transferred from the
Secretary of Labor to the EEOC until July 1, 1979. See note 4 supra.
615 F.2d at 988; see Brief for Appellee at 2. Of the twenty-five individuals
represented, twenty-one were discharged by the employer between February 28, 1973 and
June 1, 1973. 615 F.2d at 989 n.2. The employer subsequently rehired one of these in-
dividuals but discharged him again on June 24, 1975. Of the remaining four employees, one
is still employed, and the others were discharged on July 1, 1973, March 22, 1974, and
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complaint within the three-year statute of limitations period for willful
violations." The complaint sought both legal and equitable relief 8 but
did not specifically identify the individuals whom the Secretary was
representing. 7
On June 30, 1976, the employer moved for dismissal or summary
judgment.' The employer claimed that the Secretary had failed to com-
mence the action within the statute of limitations.' The United States
Magistrate"0 filed his findings and recommendations on April 12, 1978,
determining that the three-year statute of limitations had expired for
twenty-four of'the twenty-five individuals.3 1 The magistrate reasoned
that the Secretary proceeded under both sections 16 and 17 of the FLSA
when he brought an action 'for legal and equitable relief under the
ADEA.3 1 He indicated that the "plain meaning" of section 7(b) of the
ADEA,1 and the need for the specific individual names during the con-
ciliatory proceedings,"' required that the Secretary satisfy the re-
February 28, 1975. Id.; see Marshall v. Gilbarco, Inc., 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1039, 1044-45
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (list of names and dates of termination).
1 615 F.2d at 989. The complaint alleged that the three-year statute of limitations ap-
plied because the employer willfully violated the ADEA. Id. at 989 n.2. The court will deter-
mine the validity of that allegation at trial. Id- at 1017 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The Secretary filed the complaint less than three years after the
first alleged violation occurred on February 28, 1973. Id. at 989 n.2. Section 16(e)(2) of the
ADEA, which provides that the statute of limitations is tolled during conciliation efforts for
up to one year, was not yet in effect. See note 9 supra.
615 F.2d at 988-89. The Secretary requested injunctive relief under § 17 of the
FLSA, including restraint of future violations and the restraint of any withholding of sums
due to individuals as a result of past violations. The complaint also sought liquidated




A judge may designate a magistrate to conduct hearings and submit findings of fact
and recommendations for the disposition of specified motions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976).
", Marshall v. Gilbarco, Inc., 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1039, 1040 (M.D.N.C. 1978).
Following the Secretary's answer to defendant's interrogatories, the Magistrate determined
that one of the twenty-five individuals had been rehired by the employer on October 4, 1972
(after resigning on November 12, 1971) and was continuously employed by Gilbarco, Inc.
since that time. 615 F.2d at 1017.
8 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 1041.,
Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that the ADEA "shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies and procedures provided in Sections 11(b), 16 (except for subsec-
tion (a) thereof) and 17 of the FLSA." 29 U.S.C § 626(b) (1976). The magistrate found that the
directive "shall" and the conjunctive "and" required that the Secretary's action satisfy the
requirements of both § 16 and § 17. 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 1041.
84 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 1042. Section 7(b) of the ADEA requires that the
Secretary attempt to resolve disputes prior to litigation. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); see note 9
supra. The Secretary must use exhaustive, affirmative action to attempt to achieve concilia-
tion. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974). The magistrate in'
Gilbarco determined that full disclosure of specific individuals and claims is vitally.
necessary to the conciliation process. 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 1042.
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quirements of both sections 16 and 17.1 Since the Secretary had failed to
name the represented individuals in the complaint as required by section
16, the magistrate found that the EEOC had not commenced the action
within three years of the alleged violations and therefore the action was
barred by the statute of limitations.16 The district court accepted the
magistrate's findings and recommendations and granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment."
The Fourth Circuit in Gilbarco disagreed fundamentally with the
district court and found that sections 16 and 17 of the FLSA are not in-
terdependent.' The court noted several basic distinctions between the
two sections,39 including the different commencement requirements." The
court determined that an action for equitable relief was not subject to the
requirements of section 16." The Fourth Circuit held that the Secretary
21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. at 1041.
Id. at 1040. The three-year statute of limitations had not expired as to four of the
employees when the employer moved for summary judgment on June 30, 1976. See id. at
1044-45 (list of employees and termination dates). Thus, the Magistrate determined whether
the statute of limitations had expired as of the date of his decision, May 25, 1978, rather
than the date on which the employer filed its motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 1039.
615 F.2d at 989.
Id. at 989-90 n.3. In addition to its commencement requirement which still applies to
§ 16(c) actions, § 16(c) of the FLSA contained several restrictions which were deleted in
1974. Id.; see note 13 supra. The Secretary was required to obtain the written request of
employees for a § 16(c) action. Id. In addition, the Secretary was forbidden from bringing
suit in cases involving unsettled issues of law. Id. Courts had held consistently that the § 16
restrictions do not apply to § 17 actions. See Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1284
(10th Cir. 1972) (employee written consent is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a § 17 ac-
tion); Hodgson v. Katz & Besthoff, #38, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (W.D. La. 1973) (same);
Jones v. American Window Cleaning Corp., 210 F. Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. Va. 1962) (same). See
also Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1971) (novel question of law provision
does not apply to § 17); Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1971)
(same). Courts noted the absence of any congressional intent that the requirements of § 16, a
closely circumscribed remedy, should be imposed on § 17, a broad remedy with an emphasis
on public enforcement. Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d at 533-34; accord, Hodgson
v. Ewing, 451 F.2d at 530.
A few courts found that § 16(c) and § 17 are "integrally related elements of a single en-
forcement scheme," and, therefore, the requirements of § 16(c) apply to § 17. See Hodgson v.
Union de Permisionarios Circulo Rojo, 331 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (novel ques-
tion of law provision applies to § 17); Hodgson v. American Can Co., 317 F. Supp. 152, 155-56
(W.D. Ark. 1970), reversed, 440 F.2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1971) (same). The decisions finding an
interrelationship between § 16 and § 17 of the FLSA have since been reversed or question-
ed. See Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d at 530 (questioning the district court's decision in Union
de Permisionarios).
', 615 F.2d at 989-90. Section 16(c) expressly provides that an action commences on the
date when the complaint is filed if the employee is specifically named as a party plaintiff in
the complaint or, if his name does not appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is
added as a party plaintiff. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. 1978). Several courts have held that the
Secretary does not have to name the individual claimants in a § 17 complaint to commence
the action effectively for statute of limitations purposes. See text accompanying note 56 in-
" 615 F.2d at 990.
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commenced an action for equitable relief under section 17 of the FLSA
upon the filing of the complaint even though the names of the employees
were not listed on the complaint.42 The Gilbarco court noted that normal
discovery procedures could eliminate the employer's uncertainty concern-
ing the identity of the individuals seeking relief."
The Fourth Circuit determined further that Congress incorporated
the commencement requirements of section 17 of the FLSA into the
ADEA." Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lorillard v.
Pons,45 the court found that Congress incorporated fully the remedies,
procedures, and judicial interpretations of the FLSA into the ADEA,
with the exception of express changes." The court determined that Con-
gress included the uniform judicial recognition that a section 17 com-
plaint need not name the individual claimants to commence an action for
statute of limitations purposes." Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that sec-
tion 7(b) of the ADEA, by incorporating section 17 of the FLSA, provided
that the Secretary commences an action for equitable relief for viola-
42 Id.
I Id. Previous cases involving the Equal Pay Act have noted that parties may utilize
discovery procedures to determine the names of employees represented when such
employees are not specifically named in the complaint. See Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen.
Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1970). Gilbarco is an example of the suitability of normal
discovery procedures for determining the identities of individual claimants. 615 F.2d at 990.
In Gilbarco, the Secretary filed interrogatories on April 12, 1976, naming twenty-five
employees and requesting certain information about the employees from the employer. Id.
at 1016 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
On April 26, 1976, the parties stipulated that all parties, including the represented
employees, had been correctly identified. 615 F.2d at 1016; see FED. R. Civ. P. 29. The
employer filed interrogatories requesting the identities of every plaintiff, which the
Secretary provided on September 13, 1976. 615 F.2d at 1016.
615 F.2d at 989.
434 U.S. 575 (1978). The Supreme Court held in Lorillard that prior judicial deter-
mination of the right to jury trial under the FLSA meant that Congress, by incorporating
the FLSA into the ADEA, intended that the right to jury trial should also exist under the
ADEA. Id. at 580-83. See generally 1979 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 321, 331 (1979).
615 F.2d at 989. Congress stated that the enforcement provisions of the ADEA bill
ultimately enacted follow those of the FLSA. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9,
reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2218. Congress considered several
alternative proposals for the ADEA's enforcement scheme. The Johnson Administration
submitted a bill patterned after § 10(c) & (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
160(c),(e) (1976), which would have given the Secretary power to issue cease and desist
orders enforceable in the courts of appeals, but would not have granted a private right of ac-
tion to aggrieved individuals. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978); S. 830, H.R.
4221, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2218.
Congress also considered a bill which would have adopted the statutory pattern of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1976); see 434 U.S. at 578.
Senator Javits introduced the proposal that became law, designed to utilize the provisions
of the FLSA, and permitting suits by either the Secretary or the injured individual. See 113
CONG. REC. 7076, 31254 (1967).
,7 615 F.2d at 989; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
1981]
630 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
tions of the ADEA when he files the complaint, regardless of whether
the individual claimants are named.
48
Examining the specific facts in Gilbarco, the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined initially that a section 17 action for equitable relief commences
when the Secretary files the complaint.49 The Secretary's complaint,
however, included a claim for liquidated damages. 0 Liquidated damages
are available only under section 16 of the FLSA.15 Rather than hold that
the Secretary's request for liquidated damages imposed the commence-
ment requirements of section 16, the Fourth Circuit denied the li-
quidated damages claim 52 and concluded that the Secretary brought the
action solely under section 17.1 Since the Secretary complied with sec-
tion 17 by filing the complaint within three years of the alleged viola-
tions of the ADEA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's deci-
sion to grant summary judgment to the employer on the section 17
claims. 4
The Gilbarco court is in agreement with established precedent
which has recognized that a section 17 action is not governed by the com-
mencement provisions found in section 16(c).5  Several courts have ex-
pressly held that the language of section 17, in contrast to the language
of section 16(c), does not require that the Secretary identify the in-
dividual claimants to toll the statute of limitations. One court reasoned
' 615 F.2d at 989.
9 Id.
Id. at 990.
81 29 U.S.C. § 216 (Supp. 1978); see S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. -, reprinted
in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620, 1658-59; note 13 supra.
" 615 F.2d at 991. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant on the liquidated damages claim. Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991.
Judge Murnaghan's admittedly loquacious dissent, see id. at 1012, offers a combina-
tion of many arguments for the proposition that the requirements of § 16 must be applied to
§ 17. See id. at 991-1018 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dis-
sent's main argument is that the two sections are in pari materia; i.e., pertain to the same
subject matter. Id. at 1017. But see note 57 infra. The dissent asserts that since both § 17
and § 16(b) were amended in the same legislative enactment in 1961, the court should deter-
mine the meaning of "commencement" in § 17 of the FLSA by reference to § 16(b). 615 F.2d
at 1007-08; see CONF. REP. No. 327, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1706, 1713-14. In § 16(b), a cause of action is stated "upon the filing of a
complaint." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1978). Thus, the dissent reasons, the express "com-
mencement of the action" language in § 17 must refer to a point later in time than the filing
of a complaint. 615 F.2d at 999 n.23; see R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF STATUTES 224 (1975) (when different words used in statutory enactments that are in
pari materia, probability strong that different meanings intended). The commencement of a
§ 17 action must be, according to the dissent, the time at which the represented employees
are identified. 615 F.2d at 1008.
1 Wirtz v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 280 F. Supp. 376, 379-80 (D. Conn. 1968), affd as
modified, 18 Wage and Hour Cas. 894 (2d Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Novinger's, Inc., 261 F. Supp.
698, 703 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhart Constr. Co., 230 F. Supp. 823, 829 (N.D.
Ohio 1964); accord, Padgett v. Kentucky Util. Co., 83 Lab. Cas. 33,6A5 (W.D. Ky. 1978).
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that sections 16 and 17 of the ADEA are not in pari materia.17 Section 17
is a broad remedy, designed to provide equitable relief, while section 16
is a narrow legal remedy." The court found that Congress created sec-
tion 17 for the purpose of avoiding prohibitive restrictions in existing
legislation such as section 16(c).59 In the face of congressional silence,
therefore, the "commencement" requirements of section 16(c) should not
be imposed on an equitable action under section 17.60 The court looked to
the common law definition of "commencement" and concluded that a sec-
tion 17 action is commenced upon the filing of a complaint, regardless of
whether the individual claimants are named."
Another court analyzed whether section 16(c)'s commencement re-
quirement should be applied to section 17 of the FLSA by referring to
section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act.' Section 7 provides that an action
commences on the date when the complaint is filed, except in cases in-
volving collective or class actions. Since section 17 is an action for
equitable relief rather than a collective or class action, the court found
that the action commenced on the date the complaint was filed. 4 One
commentator has noted that an additional reason not to apply section
16(c)'s requirements to section 17 is that section 16(c) states that its re-
quirements apply only to actions brought specifically under the section.
1, Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhart Constr. Co., 230 F. Supp. 823, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Statutes
are in pari materia-pertain to the same subject matter-when they relate to the same per-
son or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object.
See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 298-99 (C.D. Sands 4th
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND]. Courts dealing with a variety of issues have
determined that the provisions of § 16 are not to be read in pan materia with the provisions
of § 17. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1971) (§ 16(c)'s prohibition of
suits involving novel questions of law does not apply to § 17); Shultz v. Mistletoe Express
Serv., 434 F.2d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 1970) (back wages due under § 17 action can be restored
without necessity of individual § 16 suits); Hodgson v. Katz & Besthoff, #38, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1193, 1194 (W.D. La. 1973) (§ 16(c)'s requirement of employee consent does not apply
to § 17). The 196lamendments to the FLSA do not, as the dissent suggests, prove that § 16
and § 17 are in pari materia. See CONF. REP. No. 327, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted
in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1706, 1713-14. The amendments contain nothing from
which a court could infer that "the broad remedy enacted in § 17 must be read in pari
materia with the narrow remedy of § 16." Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527,
533-34 (3d Cir. 1971).
" Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhart Constr. Co., 230 F. Supp. 823, 828-29 (N.D. Ohio 1964); see
Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1971); notes 13-14 supra. The
relief sought under § 17 is no less equitable because compliance with the decree which plain-
tiff seeks may require the defendant to pay money. Wirtz v. Robert E. Bob Adair, Inc., 224
F. Supp. 750, 756 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
'1 230 F. Supp. at 829.
ea Id.
"Id.
" Wirtz v. Novinger's, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 698, 700 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Wirtz v. Sterner's
Grocery, Inc., 54 Lab. Cas. 31,874 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
63 29 U.S.C. § 256 (1976).
261 F. Supp. at 702.
5 See Richards, supra note 13, at 335; 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. 1978).
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The Fourth Circuit relied on Lorillard v. Pons to find that the
judicial interpretation of section 17 of the FLSA, providing that the ac-
tion is commenced upon the filing of the complaint, was incorporated into
the ADEA when the ADEA was enacted in 1967. Since Gilbarco in-
volves a well-established interpretation of the FLSA,6 7 the Fourth Cir-
cuit is correct in determining that the judicial recognition of the com-
mencement of a Section 17 action upon the filing of the complaint is in-
corporated into the ADEA."8
On the whole, Gilbarco represents a logical judicial decision in the
midst of a complicated statutory structure. The Fourth Circuit's opinion
is consistent with judicial decisions regarding the commencement re-
quirements of section 17 of the FLSA 9 and serves, in addition, to apply
that reasoning to the ADEA.
DANA S. CONNELL
615 F.2d at 989.
'7 In the absence of contrary authority, Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhart Constr. Co., 230 F.
Supp. 823, 838 (N.D. Ohio 1964), represents solid authority that a § 17 action under the
FLSA commences with the filing of the complaint. See 615 F.2d at 990. Presumably, Con-
gress incorporated the Lockhart court interpretation into the ADEA. Id. at 989; see
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 580, 581 (1978); SUTHERLAND, supra note 57, at 256-61. Arguably,
however, Congress did not incorporate other authorities for that proposition into the
ADEA. The court in Wirtz v. Novinger's, 261 F. Supp. 698, 700 (M.D. Pa. 1966), based its
reasoning on § 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra. Since
§ 7 was not incorporated into the ADEA, that decision cannot be considered to be incor-
porated into the ADEA. See note 7 supra. Other cases, decided after 1967, cannot
reasonably be said to have been incorporated into the ADEA upon its enactment that year.
See Wirtz v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 280 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1968), affd as modified,
18 Wage and Hour Cas. 894 (2d Cir. 1968). However, Congress' decision not to add a specific
commencement requirement to § 17 in its 1974 amendments to the ADEA may indicate a
continuing legislative recognition that a § 17 action commences upon the filing of a com-
plaint. See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 75 (1936) (Congress' failure to change federal
statue which had been uniformly construed by lower federal courts imports legislative adop-
tion of such construction).
" Recent decisions utilize the Lorillard methodology. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (holding that federalism provision of ADEA precluded individual
claimants from bringing suit in federal court prior to sixty days after commencement of pro-
ceedings with appropriate state agency); Marshall v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 601 F.2d 100
(3d Cir. 1979) (holding that Secretary is not precluded from bringing suit without first defer-
ring to proper state agency for sixty days). See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Procedural and Substantive Issues in the Aftermath of the 1978 Amend-
ments, 1979 U. OF ILL. L.F. 665, 677-87.
" See note 56 supra.
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B. Pregnancy Discrimination Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex.2 Because only women can bear children,
the broad language of Title VII has forced courts to determine the effect
of Title VII on employment practices that distinguish pregnant women
from other employees.' Application of Title VII prohibitions is par-
ticularly difficult when the safe operation of a business depends on a
pregnant woman's ability to perform her job. In particular, airline
policies that ban pregnant stewardesses from flight duty have required
courts to balance workplace safety against employment discrimination.'
42 U.S.C. §4 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
Id. § 2000e-2. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.; see, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
328-337 (1977) (sex); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (national origin);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (race); Redmond v. GAF Corp.,
574 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1978) (religion). Congress intended Title VII to destroy artificial
and arbitrary barriers that measure an employee on the basis of alleged group attributes
rather than actual ability. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); Comment,
Title VII Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona
Fide?, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 466, 468 (1978). Title VII applies to public employers, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(h) (1976), labor organizations, id. § 2000e(d), and private employers having fifteen or
more employees, id. § 2000e(b). To take advantage of the Title VII prohibitions, an aggrieved
employee must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. § 20OOe-5(e); see McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination is present, the EEOC will attempt to stop the unlawful practice
through informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Local 179, United
Textile Wkrs. v. Fed. Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 850 (8th Cir. 1972). The employee's
right to sue under Title VII arises only after the EEOC has issued a notice of the right to
sue. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975). The EEOC must issue a notice of the right to sue if the administrative charge is
dismissed, if the EEOC has not filed a civil suit based on the charge within 180 days of the
filing of the charge, or if a conciliation agreement has not been reached with the employer
within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). After receiving
notice of the right to sue, the employee has ninety days to bring suit on his own behalf in
federal district court. Id.
I See generally Davie, Pregnancy: A Laborious Issue, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (Fal 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Laborious Issue]; Fain, Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination, 5 TEX. S. L.
REv. 54 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fain]; Kirp & Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the
Justices, 57 TEx. L. REv. 947 (1979). The Supreme Court has held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974). See generally, Fain,
supra, at 55-70.
' See, e.g., Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977)
(airline's policy of mandatory maternity leave during entire period of pregnancy held valid),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 22 EMP.
PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 30,636 at 14,409 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (airline's policy of mandatory maternity
leave during entire period of pregnancy held valid); EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F.
Supp. 626, 628 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (airline's policy of mandatory maternity leave during entire
period of pregnancy held valid), rev'd mem., 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980); Maclennan v.
American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. Va. 1977) (airline's policy of mandatory
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In Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,5 an en banc panel of the Fourth
Circuit recently addressed the pregnancy discrimination issue.
The plaintiffs in Burwell contested an Eastern Air Lines (Eastern)
rule requiring a stewardess to cease flight duty as soon as she learned of
her pregnancy.' Eastern allowed pregnant stewardesses to choose be-
tween either unpaid maternity leave or transfer to an available ground
position.' If a stewardess decided to take unpaid maternity leave she
would retain her previously accrued seniority when she returned to
work.' If a pregnant stewardess chose to transfer to a ground position,
she would lose all seniority accrued as a flight attendant.' Pregnancy
was the only disability for which Eastern prescribed loss of seniority
upon transfer to a ground position."° Arguing that Eastern's employment
practices violated Title VII, the plaintiffs requested monetary and in-
junctive relief."
The district court in Burwell held that Eastern could not deprive a
stewardess of accrued seniority if she transferred to a ground position
for a pregnancy related reason. 2 The lower court also held that, absent
complications in the pregnancy,"3 an airline cannot require all
stewardesses to stop flying during the first twenty-eight weeks of
pregnancy. 4 The district court based the holding on evidence that vir-
tually all stewardesses are able to perform their jobs through the twen-
tieth week of pregnancy. 5 From the twentieth through the twenty-
eighth week, the district court found that an individual stewardess can
accurately predict whether her pregnancy would cause an incapacitating
disability. 8 As a result, the trial court held that Eastern could set a later
date for stewardesses to cease flying' without compromising passenger
maternity leave held invalid until twenty-sixth week of pregnancy); Harriss v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 432-35 (N.D. Cal.) (airline's policy of man-
datory maternity leave during entire period of pregnancy held valid), affd on rehearing, 441
F. Supp. 881 (1977); In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249, 262-63 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(airline's policy of mandatory maternity leave held invalid until twenty-first week of preg-
nancy).
633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 363.
Id
o Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd, 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
633 F.2d at 363-64.
10 Id at 363.
11 458 F. Supp. at 476.
12 Id. at 495.
's The district court mentioned miscarriage and premature delivery as two pregnancy




Id. at 498; see note 13 supra.
17 The district court found that virtually all stewardesses are unable to perform their
job by the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. Id. at 499. Thus, the district court held that an
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safety. 8 According to the lower court, the later date would represent a
less discriminatory alternative to Eastern's maternity leave policy.19 To
remedy Eastern's discriminatory policy, the district court enjoined the
mandatory maternity leave policy and awarded damages for past
discrimination." Eastern appealed both the prospective and the
retrospective features of the district court ruling to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2
The Fourth Circuit ruling on the district court's Burwell decision
consisted of four opinions. Judge Sprouse, writing on behalf of himself
and another judge, drafted the opinion of the court. Judge Murnaghan,
writing for himself and two other judges,' and Judge Butzner, writing
for himself and three other judges,24 each filed concurring and dissenting
opinions. Judge Widener filed a separate concurring and dissenting opin-
ion" to emphasize certain medical evidence contained in the record, but
concurred completely in Judge Murnaghan's opinion.
airline policy requiring stewardesses to cease flying as of the twenty-eighth week of*
pregnancy would not violate Title VII. Id. The district court relied on the parties to the
litigation to develop the exact policy that Eastern should use in the future. Id at 503; see
note 20 infra.
"Id. at 496.
" Id. In addition to finding that Eastern should have used a less discriminatory alter-
native, the district court held that Eastern's mandatory maternityleave policy represented
a mere pretext to discriminate against women. Id. at 499. The Supreme Court has held that
a discriminatory policy which is otherwise justifiable nevertheless may violate Title VII if
an employer asserts an alleged justification for its employment policy that is actually a
pretext for discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The district court in Burwell found
that Eastern's history of discrimination toward female employees coupled with the com-
pany's unusually strict policy toward pregnancy indicated that Eastern's safety rationale
was a pretext for discrimination. 458 F. Supp. at 501.
' 458 F. Supp. at 503. The district court required Eastern to meet with the plaintiffs
to devise a mutually satisfactory system for treating pregnancy on the same basis as other
disabilities and decide on the amount of damages the court should award the plaintiffs. Id. at
503-04. In the interim, the district court allowed Eastern to condition a pregnant
stewardess' continued flight prior to the twenty-eighth week on permission from her per-
sonal physician. Id. at 504. The district court stated that Eastern could require monthly ex-
aminations from the thirteenth through the twentieth week of pregnancy, and weekly ex-
aminations from the twenty-first through the twenty-eighth week. Id. Although Eastern ap-
pealed the district court's holding, Eastern subsequently changed its mandatory maternity
leave policy to conform to a recent New York Supreme Court decision. 633 F.2d at 376
(Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting). See United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 61 A.D.2d 1010, 402 N.Y.S.2d 630, appeal denied, 44 N.Y.2d 648, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 982 (1978). Currently, Eastern allows a pregnant stewardess to continue working as
long as her doctor or Eastern's medical department certifies that she is able to perform her
job. 633 F.2d at 376.
1 633 F.2d at 363; Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
633 F.2d at 362.
Id. at 377 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 373 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 382 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
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The nine judges unanimously upheld the district court's decision
that a pregnant stewardess should not lose seniority after transferring
to a ground position. 6 On the issue of whether Eastern could require
stewardesses to cease flying during the entire period of pregnancy, the
judges were divided. Six judges, represented by the opinions of Judges
Sprouse and Butzner, held that Eastern could not ground a stewardess
during the first trimester, or thirteen weeks, of pregnancyY A five
judge majority, represented by the opinions of Judges Sprouse and Mur-
naghan, concluded that Eastern could require stewardesses to cease fly-
ing after the first thirteen weeks. 8 All nine judges agreed that Eastern
could ground stewardesses after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy.'
In deciding that Eastern could not deprive a stewardess of seniority
if she transfers to a ground position because of pregnancy, the circuit
court applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.0 In Satty, the Supreme Court held that an employer's policy of
denying accumulated seniority to employees returning from pregnancy
leave was a violation of Title VII.1' Because Eastern's seniority policy
was similar to the policy examined in Satty,32 the circuit court applied
the Satty Court's holding to the Burwell facts and found that the Eastern
policy violated Title VII. The Fourth Circuit's holding on the ac-






11 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
,1 Id. at 139-40. The Court in Satty reasoned that an employment policy which denies
accrued seniority to women who return to work after childbirth represents a substantial
burden that only women are required to carry. Id. at 142. Thus, the denial of seniority has a
disparate impact on women and violates Title VII. Id.; see text accompanying notes 35-38 in-
fra.
434 U.S. at 138-139; 633 F.2d at 364.
633 F.2d at 364. In defense of its seniority policy, Eastern argued that the seniority
policy was a bona fide seniority system contained in a collective bargaining agreement and,
therefore, was exempt from the prohibitions of Title VII under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
633 F.2d at 365. Section 2000e-2(h) provides that an employer has not violated Title VII if a
discriminatory policy has resulted from a bona fide seniority system. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(h)
(1976). The circuit court found that the discriminatory policy had resulted from Eastern's in-
terpretation of the collective bargaining agreement rather than the agreement itself. 633
F.2d at 365. As a result, the appellate court dismissed Eastern's claim. Id.
U See, e.g., Zichy v. Philadelphia, 590 F.2d 503, 507 (3rd Cir. 1979) (city's refusal to ac-
cumulate seniority during employee's maternity absence held to constitute a claim under Ti-
tle VI); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 279-81 (6th Cir. 1978) (employ-
ment policy that deprived female employees of accumulated seniority upon transfer to dif-
ferent shift held violative of Title VII), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979); Eberts v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 357, 361 (3rd Cir. 1978) (employer's denial of seniority to female
employees who take pregnancy and maternity leave illegal under Title VII); Roller v. San
Mateo, 572 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's showing that disability due to preg-
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Addressing the mandatory maternity leave issue, Judge Sprouse
employed the leading case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . In Griggs, the
Supreme Court held that an employment practice that is neutral on its
face is, nevertheless, discriminatory if the policy has a disparate impact
on a protected class. 8 The Griggs Court also established an affirmative
defense to disparate impact discrimination.17 Once an employee has
proven disparate impact discrimination, the employer may justify the
discriminatory policy by showing that it is a business necessity."
Adopting the Griggs analysis, Judge Sprouse found that Eastern's
mandatory maternity leave policy established a. prima facie case of
employment discrimination. 9 Judge Sprouse reasoned that although
Eastern's maternity leave policy was facially neutral," the policy had a
disparate impact on women."' In response to Eastern's claim that its
employment policies were necessary to insure passenger safety,42 Judge
Sprouse relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., z to evaluate Eastern's claims of business necessity." In Lorillard,
nancy adversely affects employment opportunities while other disabilities have no similar
effect establishes prima facie discrimination).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 431. In Griggs a group of black employees challenged an employment practice
that required general intelligence tests for certain jobs. Id. at 427-28. Evidence showed that
white employees generally scored higher on the test than black employees. Id. at 430. In
finding that the use of the intelligence tests violated Title VII, the court recognized that
Congress intended to prohibit both employment policies that expressly discriminate and
facially neutral policies that discriminate in effect. Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 431.
Id.; 633 F.2d at 370, 374. The courts have applied the business necessity test in a
variety of situations involving sex discrimination. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977) (necessity of height and weight requirements); Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513
F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975) (necessity of discriminatory seniority system); Fagan v. National
Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (necessity of haircut rule).
633 F.2d at 369.
,3 A facially discriminatory policy is characterized as disparate treatment discrimina-
tion. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Note, Title VII and Business
Necessity-Individuality or Convenience?, 22 AtIZ. L. REV. 79, 79 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Business Necessity].
633 F.2d at 369.
42 Brief of Appellant at 25-33, Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1980).
, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
" 633 F.2d at 371. Most of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the Lorillard
test of business necessity. E.g., Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979);
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 57 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879
(6th Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); cf. Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
437 F. Supp. 413, 432 (N.D. Cal.) (first prong of test requires that business interest in
challenged policy be necessary to primary purpose of business rather than requiring that
business interest outweigh discrimination), affd on rehearing, 441 F. Supp. 881 (1977). See
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the Fourth Circuit stated that an employer must meet three tests to
establish a business necessity defense. 5 Under Lorillard, the employer
must show a legitimate business purpose that overrides the discrimina-
tory impact of the challenged policy.46 The employer also must prove
that the disputed policy accomplishes the legitimate business purpose."'
Finally, Lorillard states that the employer must establish that no
reasonable less discriminatory alternatives to the policy are available.48
Applying the first two factors of the Lorillard test, Judge Sprouse
found that the Eastern maternity leave policy was a valid method of
achieving the legitimate business purpose of maximizing passenger
safety. 9 Nevertheless, Judge Sprouse challenged the district court's
finding that Eastern could have used an alternative less discriminatory
method of insuring passenger safety.0 Stating that the trial court's find-
ing on the foreseeability of pregnancy complications was clearly er-
roneous, Judge Sprouse concluded instead that the record contained
little evidence to indicate that Eastern could uniformly identify those
stewardesses who would experience abnormal health problems due to
pregnancy. 1 Judge Sprouse cited the need for probative facts such as
the percentage of unhealthy stewardesses who could be identified prior
to flight, statistics about pregnant employees in other industries, and
evidence that physicians would be willing to accept the responsibility for
the safety of airline passengers in evaluating the fitness of a pregnant
stewardess.2 In the absence of these probative facts, Judge Sprouse
stated that the court should not be allowed to substitute a judicially
created policy for an employer's reasonable but discriminatory policy.'
Accordingly, Judge Sprouse reversed the trial court's legal conclusion
that a reasonable alternative to Eastern's policy exists until a
stewardess enters the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy.' Judge
Sprouse found, however, that the record contained no evidence to sus-
tain Eastern's policy during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy.
generally Business Necessity, supra note 40, at 84-88; Note, Business Necessity Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L. J. 98 (1974).




" 633 F.2d at 371-72.
See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
" 633 F.2d at 367.
Id. at 367 n.6.
' Id. at 371, 373.
" Id. at 372. After reversing the district court's reasonable alternative finding, Judge
Sprouse also disagreed with the district court's holding that Eastern's safety rationale was
a pretext for discrimination against female flight attendants. Id. at 373; see note 16 supra.
Judge Murnaghan also concluded the evidence did not show that Eastern's policy was a
pretext. Id. at 380-81 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Butzner did not ad-
dress the pretext issue.
'5 633 F.2d at 372 (Sprouse, J.). The Burwell plaintiffs did not seriously contend that a
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Thus, Judge Sprouse's holding would allow Eastern to require steward-
esses to cease flying after the thirteenth week of pregnancy.
Although Judge Butzner agreed with Judge Sprouse that the Fourth
Circuit's Lorillard decision was dispositive of the mandatory maternity
leave issue, 6 Judge Butzner disagreed with Judge Sprouse's holding
that individual examination of pregnant stewardesses would not isolate
those stewardesses vho might be unable to perform their jobs.57 Citing
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Butzner explained
that the circuit court could reverse the district court's finding on the
foreseeability of incapacitating pregnancy complications only if the find-
ing was clearly erroneous.5 Judge Butzner referred to medical testi-
mony which supported the conclusion that pregnancy complications are
foreseeable.59 Judge Butzner also cited the current policy of Northwest
Airlines allowing a stewardess to fly until the twenty-eighth week of
pregnancy if she has received a doctor's permission.0 Finally, Judge
Butzner mentioned Eastern's current policy of allowing a pregnant
stewardess to continue flying as long as she has the permission of her
doctor or Eastern's medical department." Based on this evidence, Judge
Butzner concluded that the trial court's finding of the existence of a
reasonable, less discriminatory alternative was not clearly erroneous.
2
As a result, Judge Butzner would have affirmed the lower court's opin-
ion on the mandatory maternity leave issue. 3
Adopting an approach different from Judges Sprouse and Butzner,
Judge Murnaghan recommended complete affirmance of Eastern's re-
quirement that a stewardess cease flying as soon as she learns of her
pregnancy. 4 Judge Murnaghan distinguished the Burwell case on its
facts from other Title VII cases. 5 Because pregnancy was both the
reason for and method of Eastern's differentiation between employees,
pregnant stewardess should continue to fly after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. Id.
at 371. All the testimony gathered at trial indicated that a stewardess should not remain on
flight duty after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy. Id. at 366.
Id. at 374 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting).




, Id. at 376-77; see note 20 supra.
633 F.2d at 377 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id Although he would have affirmed the district court's decision, Judge Butzner
would have remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider the relief granted
in light of subsequent changes in Eastern's policies. Id.; see note 20 supra.
633 F.2d at 377 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 378. In particular, Judge Murnaghan distinguished Eastern's mandatory
maternity leave policy from the type of discrimination found in New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (disparate impact race discrimination), Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (disparate treatment race discrimination), Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (disparate impact race discrimination), and Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate impact race discrimination).
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Judge Murnaghan suggested that the court should adopt a different
analysis than that used in any prior Supreme Court cases in the Title VII
area." Judge Murnaghan reasoned that the applicable test in Burwell
should be whether the airline's statutory duty to maintain the highest
possible degree of safety in the operation of passenger airline flights re-
quires the disqualification of pregnant stewardesses from flight duty. 7
Viewing the evidence as indicating that the pregnancy of a stewardess
may affect adversely the safety of airline passengers,6 8 Judge Mur-
naghan found that the airline's mandatory maternity leave policy was a
valid means of minimizing risk.69
The distinction drawn by Judge Murnaghan between Eastern's man-
datory maternity leave policy and other discriminatory employment
practices is not supported by any analogous Title VII cases. 0 Judge Mur-
naghan's conclusion that a different legal analysis from other varieties of
Title VII cases is required for cases involving discrimination against
pregnant women because they are pregnant adds an unneeded dimen-
sion to an already complicated field of law. Regardless of the factual set-
ting in which an alleged discriminatory policy is promulgated, courts
must determine whether discrimination actually exists and, if so,
whether it is justified in the particular business setting. Judges
633 F.2d at 379 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting).
" Id. at 379-80. Judge Murnaghan cited § 601(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1421(b) (1976), as the source of an airline's duty to maintain the highest possible degree of
safety. Id. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is charged with promulgation
of safety standards for the airline industry, does not, however, require mandatory maternity
leave for pregnant flight attendants. 458 F. Supp. at 485. In fact, the FAA has expressed
disapproval for airline policies that require maternity leave upon knowledge of pregnancy.
Id. at 500 n.15.
633 F.2d at 380 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Murnaghan main-
tained that, because of the likelihood of miscarriage during the first thirteen weeks of
pregnancy, a stewardess' pregnancy would compromise passenger safety even during that
period. Id In support of this assertion, Judge Murnaghan cited evidence in the record that
100/0 of all pregnant women miscarry and 90% of all miscarriages occur during the first thir-
teen weeks of pregnancy. Id at 380 n.8. In a separate opinion, Judge Butzner discounted the
possibility of a disabling miscarriage in the first thirteen weeks during a flight on the basis
of evidence that certain symptoms precede miscarriage that would warn a stewardess to
avoid flying. Id. at 376 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Butzner also cited
evidence that pregnant stewardesses in the past regularly had continued flying through the
thirteenth week due to Eastern's lax enforcement of its policy. Id.
Id at 380 (Murnaghan, J., concurring and dissenting).
70 Other courts considering the legality of employment policies that distinguish
employees on the basis of pregnancy have used the Title VII analysis set out in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and its progeny. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136, 141-146 (1977) (policy of seniority accrual evaluated under Griggs analysis);
Harper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 619 F.2d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1980) (policy of requiring
normal menstrual cycle prior to return to work evaluated under G-iggs analysis); deLaurier
v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1978) (mandatory maternity
leave policy evaluated under Griggs analysis).
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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Sprouse and Butzner effectively accomplished this objective in the
disparate impact setting through use of the Lorillard test,72 notwithstand-
ing their disagreement on the inferences the court should draw from the
evidence presented at trial.
While Judges Sprouse and Butzner employed the correct standard
for disparate impact discrimination, the court should have considered
the 1978 amendments to Title VII.73 Because the amendments becameef-
fective7 ' during the period between the decisions of the Burwell district
and circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit erroneously disregarded the
amendments in its review of the trial court's grant of injunctive relief. 5
The 1978 amendments define discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as
prima facie discrimination on the basis of sex.78 Eastern's policy of treat-
,2 See text accompanying notes 43-63 supra.
" Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). Congress intended the 1978 amendments to overrule
the Supreme Court's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) in General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4750-51; S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977).
In Gilbert, the Court ruled that an employee disability plan which discriminated against
pregnancy related disabilities did not constitute disparate treatment discrimination under
Title VII. 429 U.S. at 136. Although Congress intended to invalidate the Court's Gilbert
holding, Congress did not limit the language of the amendment to discriminatory disability
plans. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978). The Senate report on the amendments predicted
that the most important effect of the legislation would be the impact on discriminatory
policies other than fringe benefit programs. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
" The effective date of the 1978 amendments was October 31, 1978, except for fringe
benefit programs covered by the legislation. Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 2, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The amendments became effective for
fringe benefit programs on April 29, 1979. Id.
, Examination of the relief requested by the Burwell plaintiffs indicates that the 1978
amendments are applicable to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Burwell even though the suit
was instituted in 1974. An appellate court should give prospective effect to a statute that
supersedes a previously applied statute. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
714-15 (1973); Zichy v. Philadelphia, 590 F.2d 503, 508 (3rd Cir. 1979); Peony Park, Inc. v.
O'Malley, 223 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1955); 1A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 27.04, at 313 (4th ed. 1972); see Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 79-1200,
slip op. at 10-13 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1980) (court should not give retroactive effect to 1978
amendments); cf. Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 20 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH)
30,082 n.1 (D. Md. 1979) (1978 amendments not applicable to pre-1978 claims for monetary
relief). The plaintiff's request that the Burwell court enjoin Eastern's mandatory maternity
policy was a request for prospective relief. See 458 F. Supp. at 503-04; cf. Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1975) (injunctive relief designed to deter not to
punish); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (injunctive relief looks to future con-
duct); Loya v. Immigration and Nat. Serv., 583 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1978) (injunctive
relief designed to deter future misconduct). Thus, the Fourth Circuit should have evaluated
the effect of the 1978 amendments on the propriety of the district court's partial injunction
of Eastern's mandatory maternity leave policy.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978); see Somers v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 464 F.
Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (school's mandatory maternity leave policy violated Title VII in
view of Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments of 1978), aff'd per curiam, 620 F.2d 298 (5th
Cir. 1980). See generally Blackmun, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 16 GA. S. B. J. 43
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ing pregnant flight attendants differently from non-pregnant flight at-
tendants was, therefore, a facially discriminatory policy by statutory
definition.77 The appropriate affirmative defense78 for a facially
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Blackmun]; Note, Employment Discrimination- "Sex
Discrimination" Under Title VII Includes Differential Treatment of Pregnancy Related
Disabilities, 45 Mo. L. REV. 145 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimination].
The House Report on the 1978 amendments stated that the bill would make any distinctions
based on pregnancy a per se violation of Title VII. H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749, 4751; see Employment Discrimina-
tion, supra, at 145-46. By making pregnancy discrimination a per se violation of Title VII,
Congress expressly intended to avoid the difficulties associated with disparate impact
analysis. H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4749, 4751, see Laborious Issue, supra note 3, at 38-39 (Congress considered and
rejected Gilbert impact analysis).
" See note 76 supra.
78 The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments indicates that
even if Eastern's mandatory maternity leave policy violates § 2000e(k), Eastern could at-
tempt to prove a legal justification for the discriminatory policy. In addition to equating
pregnancy discrimination with sex discrimination, the amendments also state that
employers must treat pregnant employees the same as other employees who are similar in
ability or inability to work. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978); see text accompanying note
76 supra. The language of the amendments, however, does not indicate whether the require-
ment of equal treatment pre-empts the legal justifications for unequal treatment provided
elsewhere in Title VII. See, e.g., note 33 supra (bona fide seniority system exempt from Title
VII); text accompanying note 80 infra (BFOQ defense applicable to disparate treatment).
The legislative history to the amendments, however, states that, other than including the
special biological conditions of women within the scope of sex discrimination, the amend-
ments do not change the application of Title VII in any other way. S. REP. No. 331, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977). Thus, Congress intended to allow employers to justify pregnancy-
related discriminatory employment practices on the same grounds as other types of sex
discrimination. Although the requirement of equal treatment contained in the amendments
to Title VII does not appear to pre-empt the application of previously established affirm-
ative defenses, the language of the amendments implies another affirmative defense that
applies only to pregnancy-related discrimination. By requiring employers to treat pregnant
women the same as similarly disabled employees, Congress implied that employers could
single out pregnancy as a possible disability so long as pregnancy-related disabilities are
treated the same as other disabilities. See H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4752 (statement in House report that
amendments only require equal treatment). To treat pregnant employees the same as
similar non-pregnant employees, the amendments require that an employer use the same
methods of determining ability or inability to work for all possible disabled employees. H.R.
REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 4749,
4753; S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1979); Questions
and Answers on the Pregnancy Disability Act, id. § 1604.10 app. Answer 6.
Viewing the Burwell decision in light of the 1978 amendments, Eastern would have dif-
ficulty showing that pregnant flight attendants are treated the same as other employees. At
the time of the Burwell trial, Eastern had no specific guidelines for determining the ability
of non-pregnant flight attendants to perform their duties. 458 F. Supp. at 495. Evidence in
the record revealed, however, that Eastern allowed certain diabetic and epileptic flight at-
tendants to continue flying on an individual basis under the supervision of the Eastern
medical department. 633 F.2d at 376 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting); Brief of Ap-
pe at 54, Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). Expert
f "iso indicated that the chances of incapacity are greater with the diabetic and
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discriminatory practice79 is the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense rather than the business necessity defense." Thus, the
circuit court should have examined the prospective portion of the
district court's holding under a BFOQ analysis rather than a business
necessity analysis." Because the BFOQ and business necessity defenses
embody different elements," the application of the BFOQ defense by the
epileptic flight attendant than with flight attendants in the second trimester of pregnancy.
633 F.2d at 376. In order to accord the same treatment to pregnant stewardesses and other
possibly disabled flight attendants, Eastern should determine each pregnant stewardess'
ability or inability to continue flying by individual medical examination.
7' See note 40 supra.
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d at 370 (Sprouse, J.); B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 292-93 (1976). Title VII expressly provides for
a BFOQ defense. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). The BFOQ defense has two components.
First, the employer must show that the discriminatory policy furthers the essence of the
business. Second, the employer must show that substantially all members of the aggrieved
class are unable to perform satisfactorily the duties of the job involved or that dealing with
the members of the class individually is impractical. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271
(4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976). The
two-pronged approach to the BFOQ defense originated in two Fifth Circuit cases involving
sex discrimination. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1969),
the Fifth Circuit invalidated a facially disciminatory hiring policy because the defendant
company could not show that substantially all women were unable to perform the job satisfacto-
rily. Id. at 235. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971),
the Fifth Circuit again invalidated a facially discriminatory hiring policy on the ground that
the sex of the job applicant was not an essential quality required for adequate performance
of the particular job. Id at 388. The Supreme Court cited the Weeks and Diaz standards
with approval in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). See note 81 infra. See
generally Note, Dothard v. Rawlinson: Misapplication of the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification Defense, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 197 (1978). The cases that have dealt with the
BFOQ defense clearly indicate that the burden of proving a BFOQ rests on the employer.
Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d at 1271; In re Nat. Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 262 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
" Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d at 370; see note 80 supra. Eastern
argued both a business necessity and a BFOQ defense in its brief. Brief of Appellant at
25-43, Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court
has recognized implicitly that different defenses apply to different types of discrimination.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the court dealt with two employment policies
of the Alabama penitentiary system. The plaintiffs in Dothard challenged a statute that re-
quired all applicants for law enforcement jobs to meet minimum height and weight re-
quirements and an administrative regulation that forbade the hiring of women for certain
jobs in maximum security prisons. Id. at 323-25. The Court viewed the minimum height and
weight requirements as having a disparate impact on women. I&d at 330-31; see text ac-
companying notes 37-38 supra. The Court found that the prison system's total exclusion of
women from certain jobs was discriminatory treatment. 433 U.S. at 332-33. To determine
whether the prison system was justified in maintaining either of the policies, the Court ex-
amined the former policy in light of the business necessity defense and the latter policy in
light of the BFOQ defense. Id at 329, 334. But see DeLaurier v. San Diego United School
Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978) (court recognized business necessity defense as
justification for prima facie disermination); Business Necessity, supra note 40, at 80 (BFOQ
and business necessity defenses are interchangeable).
' See text accompanying notes 44-48 and note 80 supra.
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Fourth Circuit may have necessitated a different result in Burwell.3
The applicability of the Fourth Circuit's Burwell decision to subse-
quent Title VII cases is limited. In the future, the 1978 amendments to
Title VIP and the concurrent application of the BFOQ defense85 will re-
quire courts to apply different legal standards to pregnancy discrimina-
tion cases." Nevertheless, because the tests for the BFOQ and business
necessity affirmative defenses involve similar considerations pertaining
to a stewardess' ability to perform her duties,"7 the Burwell decision pro-
vides valuable insight into judicial resolution of challenges to mandatory
maternity leave policies. The factual disagreement between Judges
Sprouse and Butzner88 concerning the foreseeability of incapacitating
pregnancy complications illustrates the reluctance of the judiciary to
fully extend anti-discrimination policies into an area where the effect of
judicial intervention on the public's safety is uncertain. Inevitably, this
reluctance will play a similar role in the application of the BFOQ defense
to airline pregnancy discrimination cases.
ROBERT M. COUCH
In Burwell, Judge Sprouse stated that Eastern probably would not be successful in
pursuing a BFOQ defense as justification for the mandatory maternity leave policy prior to
the third trimester of pregnancy. 633 F.2d at 370 n.15. At trial, Eastern argued both BFOQ
and business necessity as defense for the maternity leave policy. Brief of Appellees at 38,
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). The district court considered
Eastern's BFOQ defense and found that non-pregnancy is not a bona fide occupational
qualification for a stewardess position. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474,
497 (E.D. Va. 1978); Cf In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142,
1145-46 (7th Cir. 1978) (airline's BFOQ defense insufficient to justify no-motherhood rule for
flight attendants).
See note 76 supra.
See text accompanying 76-80 supra.
See note 78 and text accompanying note 81 supra.
If applied to the Burwell facts, both the business necessity and BFOQ defenses
would have evaluated the ability of pregnant stewardesses to perform their jobs. As il-
lustrated in Judge Sprouse's opinion, the crucial factor in the application of the Lorillard
test for a business necessity was whether a less discriminatory method existed for deter-
mining the ability of pregnant stewardesses to perform in emergency situations than to set
an arbitrary date for them to cease flying. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
Likewise, the second component of the test for a BFOQ examines whether substantially all
members of the aggrieved class can perform the essential duties of the particular job. See
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236-38 (5th Cir. 1976) (age requirement for
bus drivers to insure safety of passengers examined under BFOQ analysis); 458 F. Supp. at
497-99; note 80 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 49-72 supra.
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C. Standards of Proof in Title VII Litigation
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in both public2 and private employment.' Title VII bars employ-
ment practices that are overtly discriminatory,4 as well as employer
policies that are facially neutral yet discriminatory in effect.' Title VII
plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case6 of employment discrimina-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
' Id. § 2000e(h).
I Id. § 2000e(b). To proceed under Title VII a plaintiff must file an administrative
claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within
180 days of the alleged discriminatory action for evaluation and attempted conciliation by
the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(e); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
Thereafter, the plaintiff may not sue under Title VII unless the EEOC notifies him of a right
to sue. See Local 179, United Textile Wkrs. v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 851
(8th Cir. 1972). As a result of its own investigation, the EEOC may issue notice of the right
to sue after dismissing the administrative charge, terminating conciliation discussions with
the defendant, or failing to bring suit within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Upon receipt of notice of the right to sue, the plaintiff has 90 days within
which to bring suit in federal district court. Id. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VIIRecon-
sidered The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824
(1972).
Plaintiffs may also seek redress for racial discrimination in public and private employ-
ment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 135, 140 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), modified on other grounds, 496 F.2d 500 (6th .Cir. 1974). Section 1981 grants
equal rights with regard to making and enforcing contracts. Plaintiffs claiming under §
1981, or under both § 1981 and Title VII, can avoid the delay-ridden EEOC administrative
procedures. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); note 7 infra.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); note 8 infra.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that
he was a member of a racial minority, that he sought a promotion offered by his employer to
a position for which he was qualified, that his employer rejected him despite his qualifica-
tions, and that after his rejection the position remained available to others with comparable
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see note 7 infra.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas noted that because facts will vary in Title VII cases, the
prima facie proof requirement also will vary in differing factual situations.Id at 802 n.13. After
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions. Id. at 802; see note 7 infra.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, see note 8 infra, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that an employment practice effectively denies equal employment oppor-
tunities to members of a protected class. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971). The disparate impact test is not applicable to an individual instance of discrimination
even though the discrimination may be directly traceable to a particular employment prac-
tice. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). To make a valid disparate impact claim, the plaintiff
must establish a practice of discrimination by the employer. See 401 U.S. at 430-32; Wright
v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1979). A prima facie
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tion by showing that the employer's actions either result in disparate
treatment7 of an individual or have a disparate impact8 on a class of in-
case of discrimination is rebuttable by the defendant's showing that the allegedly
discriminatory employment practices arise out of business necessity. 401 U.S. at 431; see
note 8 infra.
' Disparate treatment is a theory of discrimination for which the United States
Supreme Court promulgated a tripartite proof standard in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In contrast to the disparate impact theory, see note 8 infra, a
plaintiff using the disparate treatment theory ultimately must prove discriminatory intent
on the part of the employer. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
The plaintiffs initial burden, however, is not hard to meet. The plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment without evidence of discriminatory intent. See 2 A.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.10 (1980). After the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its action. 411 U.S. at 802.
If the defendant employer successfully rebuts the prima facie case, the plaintiff has an
opportunity to show that the defendant's allegedly nondiscriminatory reasons are only a
"pretext" shielding discriminatory intent. Id. at 804. See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). Once the plaintiff brings the defendant's motivation into
issue, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion with regard to the defendant's intentional
discrimination. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 27 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
' Disparate impact is a theory of discrimination promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). Congress was
aware that employment discrimination is an institutionalized class problem and therefore is
more likely to be a systematic condition resulting from widespread practices than from
isolated events. See S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5; S. REP. No. 91-1137, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 4. Prior to Griggs, Title VII plaintiffs faced the formidable task of proving
discriminatory intent. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 79-80 (1973). The disparate
impact test, however, has enabled courts to recognize Title VII violations that were formerly
unprovable. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977) (disparate impact of
minimum height and weight requirements); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490,
494 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (disparate impact of employee discharge for wage garnishment).
To prove discriminatory employment practices under the Griggs test, a plaintiff must
establish that a facially neutral employment policy or practice disproportionately burdens
the claimant's protected group. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975);
3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 74.10 (1980). Without identifying any particular
policy or practice, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with
statistical proof of gross underrepresentation of a protected group in a particular group of
employees or job classification. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
307-08 (1977). Usually, however, the proof of a disparate impact claim entails a three-step
analysis. See 433 U.S. at 329.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the
defending employer may rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case by showing that the allegedly
discriminatory employment practices are related to job performance. See 433 U.S. at 329;
401 U.S. at 431. The Fourth Circuit considers employment practices to be "job related" if
the employer demonstrates that the practice effectuates the safe and efficient operation of
the business. See Robinsonv. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The employer may rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case by
demonstrating that the business purpose advanced is compelling enough to override any
racial impact and that there are no less discriminatory practices available to accomplish the
stated purpose. Id.
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dividuals.9 In Wright v. National Archives and Records Service," the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the standards of proof applicable to a Title
VII claim based on the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories of discrimination in the context of an affirmative action train-
ing program.
The plaintiff in Wright was a black civil service employee of the Na-
tional Archives and Records Service (Service), a component of the
General Services Administration." Wright participated in the Archives
Specialists Training Program, a program that the Service instituted in
1968 to qualify employees for promotion to managerial roles in the Ser-
vice. 2 Initially, the Service accepted applications for the program only
from employees who were college graduates and who had passed the
Federal Service Entrance Examination." In 1969, however, as part of an
Equal Employment Opportunity Affirmative Action Program, Service
administrators relaxed entrance requirements in order actively to
recruit black Service employees into the program. 4 Plaintiff Wright was
one of the recruits.1 5 At the conclusion of the two year training program,
Wright's supervisors did not promote him." Wright refused the super-
visors' offer of a special training extension and brought a Title VII racial
discrimination suit.' In his complaint, Wright alleged that the operation
Nevertheless, the plaintiff may ultimately establish liability by proposing alternative
methods by which the defendant could advance its legitimate business interests without
disproportionately affecting the plaintiffs protected class. 433 U.S. at 329; 422 U.S. at 425.
9 Groups traditionally "protected" by Title VII include racial, religious, and ethnic
minorities as well as women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976). Although in McDonnell
Douglas the Supreme Court recognized that the prima facie test for disparate treatment is
flexible, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973), the classic formulation of the prima facie test includes
minority status as one of its elements. Id. at 802. Title VII, however, applies to all
employees, including white males. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
279-80 (1976). Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, Title VII assumes that white
males, females, and minorities qualify equally for all jobs. See Copus, The Numbers Game Is
The Only Game In Town, 20 How. L.J. 374, 383 (1977).
" 609 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 Id. at 705; Brief for Appellee at 4, Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609
F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1979).
12 609 F.2d at 706.
is Id.
" Id.; see note 35 infra.
II 609 F.2d at 706.
16 Id.
" Id. at 709-10. The Fourth Circuit noted that Wright had alleged both the disparate
impact and the disparate treatment theories of discrimination. Id. at 710-11; see notes 7 & 8
supra. The district court employed a disparate treatment analysis of the evidence in
Wright's case. 609 F.2d at 710. The Fourth Circuit, however, interpreted the district court's
opinion as also having applied the disparate impact test. Id at 710-11. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the appropriate method of adjudicating a combined impact and treatment
claim is to treat the theories as alternative grounds for Title VII relief. Id.; see Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The Fourth Circuit noted that the evolving
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of the program had a disparate impact on his class and the subsequent
failure to promote him constituted disparate treatment of him as an in-
dividual.18
The Fourth Circuit first addressed Wright's disparate impact
claim.19 Wright alleged that a disproportionate number of black trainees
had failed to complete the course successfully because the supervisors
provided blacks with inferior training."0 Considering Wright's claim, the
court emphasized that the Service's allegedly discriminatory personnel
actions affected only four persons, three blacks and one white.21 The
court noted that of these three minority members, only Wright claimed
to have suffered legally cognizable harm. The court held that the
challenged employment practice did not have a disparate impact because
state of discrimination law during the extended litigation of Wright's case may have caused
confusion as to applicable discrimination theories. 609 F.2d at 711 n.5 (Wright entered the
training program in April of 1970. The United States Supreme Court decided Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in 1971 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), in 1973).
In addition to his disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, Wright also alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) and the fifth amendment. 609 F.2d at 705 n.1. See
generally note 6 supra. Wright did not, however, allege that the district court had erred in
denying these claims. The Fourth Circuit therefore did not address the § 1981 and fifth
amendment issues on appeal. I&
" 609 F.2d at 711. The district court noted that the Service's management was com-
mitted to remedying racial discrimination. Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv.,
388 F. Supp. 1205, 1212-13 (D. Md. 1975). Title VII does not require a trial de novo from
EEOC rulings and limits review by courts to the administrative record. Id. at 1207; 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). The district court affirmed the EEOC's denial of Wright's
discrimination claims and granted the Service's motion for summary judgment. 388 F. Supp.
at 1213. On Wright's first appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court judgment
and remanded the case for a new trial. 609 F.2d at 706 n.2. On remand the district court
reviewed the evidence and concluded as a matter of law that the Service had not
discriminated against Wright. Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., [1977] 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 4, 5 (D.Md. 1977). The district court held that the Service had
demonstrated that Wright lacked the skills necessary for promotion and had advanced
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting him. See 609 F.2d at 716-17.
Wright appealed to the Fourth Circuit a second time alleging racially discriminatory per-
sonnel actions. Prior to filing a panel opinion, the Fourth Circuit ordered rehearing en banc.
Id. at 706 n.3. On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
Wright had failed to establish a Title VII violation. Id. at 718.
19 609 F.2d at 711; see note 8 supra. The Fourth Circuit noted that judicial economy
favors consideration of the disparate impact theory prior to the disparate treatment theory
in cases where the plaintiff advances both theories. 609 F.2d at 711 n.7. After establishment
of a prima facie case, both the plaintiff's and the court's tasks are easier under the impact
theory than under the treatment theory. Id.; see notes 7 & 8 supra.
609 F.2d at 712.
21 Id. Absent a statute expressly conferring standing, a plaintiff must suffer actual or
threatened injury as a result of the alleged unlawful conduct in order to have standing to
allege discriminatory employer activity under Title VII. Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
566 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977).
' 609 F.2d at 712; see note 8 supra.
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the affected minority group was so small in number and only one mem-
ber of the group had claimed that the program had a discriminatory im-
pact.'
The Fourth Circuit noted that if Wright were allowed to recover
under the disparate impact theory, courts and future plaintiffs might in-
terpret such a holding to support a prima facie case of disparate impact
whenever a single white male employee received an employment benefit
that a comparable member of a protected group24 did not receive."5 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that recognition of a disparate impact claim on
the facts of Wright would constitute an unregulated extension of the
disparate impact doctrine and would undercut the purposes of Title
VII.
26
The court next considered Wright's second theory of Title VII
discrimination, disparate treatment.' In contrast to the disparate impact
theory,' the disparate treatment theory requires the plaintiff to prove
discriminatory motive on the part of the employer.' On appeal, Wright
conceded that he did not qualify for promotion and based his discrimina-
tion claim on the differences between the training that he had received
and the training that the supervisors had provided for the white trainee
in his program. 0 Wright alleged that the supervisors intentionally had
given him inferior training because he was black." Wright claimed,
therefore, that the inferior training was the effective cause of his lack of
qualification for promotion.2
The court reasoned that even if Wright could establish a prima facie
case, Wright would be unable to overcome the Service's defense.3 In a
Title VII disparate treatment claim, if the defendant employer can
demonstrate that his actions were legitimately nondiscriminatory, 4 the
24 See note 9 supra.
21 609 F.2d at 713 n.11.
2 Id. at 713; see text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
1 609 F.2d at 713. The Fourth Circuit noted in Wright that McDonnell Douglas pro-
vided the basic framework for analysis of the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim. 609 F.2d
at 713; see notes 6 & 7 supra.
See note 8 supra.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); note 7 supra.
- '7 609 F.2d at 715.
31 Id.
12 Id The Fourth Circuit questioned whether the evidence established a prima facie
case with regard to Wright's allegedly inferior training opportunities. Id Although the
McDonnell Douglas test is adaptable to claims of unequal training opportunities, see Long
v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 n.11 (6th Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit had difficulty
strictly applying McDonnell Douglas in Wright because the training program involved only
a small number of persons and was intended to qualify participants for managerial positions.
609 F.2d at 715; see note 6 supra.
609 F.2d at 716.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see note 7 supra.
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burden shifts back to the plaintiff employee to demonstrate that the
employer's justification is a mere pretext for discriminatory policies or
practices. 5 The court acknowledged the Service's justification for its
actions, including testimony by the single white employee that he sought
out supervisory assistance while the black trainees did not. The court
also noted that the Service had a practice of delegating assignments and
opportunities according to the trainees' abilities." Wright argued that
the Service's reasons were pretextual because they did not reflect goals
specifically maximizing Wright's opportunities in relation to those of the
white employee. 8
The Fourth Circuit rejected Wright's pretext argument. The court
stressed that although Title VII prohibits discriminatory practices, Title
VII does not require an employer to adopt special hiring procedures to
maximize the hiring of minority employees. 9 Applying this analysis to
the training program, the Fourth Circuit held that Title VII did not
obligate the Service to favor Wright without consideration of other fac-
tors such as the white trainee's qualifications. 0 The Fourth Circuit
therefore concluded that to hold that Wright had established a disparate
treatment claim would be inconsistent with the standard of proof that
Congress intended for Title VII cases.41 The court noted that the heavier
burden on the employer, which Wright had urged, would induce
employers to undertake only the most unobtrusive and limited affir-
mative efforts to better employment opportunities for minority
employees.42
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright is consistent with recent
United States Supreme Court decisions that make it more difficult for a
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in employment discrimination
cases.43 The Supreme Court severely limited the effectiveness of a plain-
tiff's constitutional discrimination claim in Washington v. Davis by re-
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); see note 7 supra.
609 F.2d at 715-16.
Id The Service was responsive to black participants' needs and concerns with
regard to the training program in Wright. Id- at 716. To encourage initial admission of
blacks to the program, the Service lowered entrance requirements and continued actively to
recruit blacks to the exclusion of whites. Id at 706, 716; see text accompanying notes 13 &
14 supra. The Service removed one of the program supervisors when black trainees
objected to her attitude. 609 F.2d at 707. When the black trainees complained of seating pat-
terns, the Service changed them. Id. at 706-07. Following the black trainees' objection to the
white trainee's assignment to the Special Projects Staff, the Service assigned black trainees
to the Staff. I& at 708.
609 F.2d at 717.
Id.; see Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
609 F.2d at 717.
41 Id at 717-18.
42 Id at 718.
See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-87 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976);
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quiring proof of discriminatory intent.4 Formerly, plaintiffs could
establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination merely by
showing that an employer's actions had a disproportionate impact on a
protected class of employees. 5 In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,6
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not establish intent by
demonstrating that the defendant could foresee the discriminatory im-
pact of a facially neutral policy. 7 And in a substantial departure from
precedent, the Supreme Court in New York City Transit, Authority v.
Beazer 8 rejected the plaintiff's use of general population statistics to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 9 Without discussion of
prior Supreme Court decisions allowing the use of general population
statistics," the Beazer Court stated that plaintiffs must provide
text accompanying notes 42-49 infra. See generally Friedman, The Burger Court and the
Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1979). See also note 6 supra.
" 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976).
," Id. at 244. In Washington, two blacks made an unsuccessful constitutional challenge
to the District of Columbia Police Department's recruiting procedures. Id. at 232-33. Plain-
tiffs based their claim on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id- At the time
plaintiffs filed their complaint, Title VII did not apply to federal employees. See the 1972
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 2(1) & (2) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a) & (b) (1976). The plaintiffs did not claim intentional discrimination. 426
U.S. at 235. The plaintiffs alleged only that testing procedures were unrelated to job perfor-
mance and had a discriminatory impact on black appllicants. Davis v. Washington, 348 F.
Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In
holding that proof of disparate impact was insufficient to show unconstitutional racial
discrimination, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent to
establish a prima facie case. 426 U.S. at 238-39, 242, 245-48.
'5 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
', Id. at 278-79. In Feeney, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
Massachusetts statute giving veterans preferential treatment in all state civil service ap-
pointments, claiming that the statute had a disparate impact on women. Id. at 259. The
plaintiff further contended that because the preferential treatment was foreseeable, the
discriminatory results were intentional. Id. at 278-79. The United States Supreme Court
held, however, that the state legislature's awareness that the statute could result in an
adverse impact on women did not indicate that adverse impact was the purpose of the
statute. Il.
440 U.S. 568 (1979).
I& at 584-87.
The Court in Beazer held that statistical evidence may establish a prima facie viola-
tion of Title VII. Id. at 584-87. Statistics are not, however, irrefutable, and the plaintiffs'
statistics in Beazer failed to prove a Title VH violation. Id The Court rejected one set of
statistics as too general since they failed to show the percentage of employees actually
dismissed as a result of a Transit Authority drug policy. Id. at 585. The Court considered a
second set of statistics to be overly inclusive because the statistics included individuals out-
side the relevant class of applicants-and employees receiving methadone treatment. Id. at
585-86. The Beazer Court did not, however, attempt to distinguish either Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), or Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), from Beazer's
shift in method of statistical analysis in disparate impact cases.
The Court in Griggs used general population statistics to compare the percentage of
blacks and whites who failed to satisfy an employer's facially neutral high school diploma re-
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statistical evidence demonstrating the degree of impact on individual
applicants."
In Wright, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Title VII is not a
catchall for employment grievances. Although Title VII prohibits an
employer from making employment decisions on a discriminatory basis,
Title VII does not impose a duty on the employer to take affirmative
action to increase the number of minority employees.2 The court noted
that Title VII guarantees all employees the right to expect their
employer to treat them without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."1 The court, therefore, was sensitive to Wright's dis-
crimination claims and acknowledged that the Service's treatment of
Wright may have been improvident. 4 Affirmative action training pro-
grams involve risks for both employers and employees, however, and the
court realistically refused to acknowledge mere improvidence, and even
insensitivity, as violations of Title VII. 55
To recognize an employer's improvidence as a Title VII violation
would ultimately impair affirmative action programs by imposing such
high risks on employers that they would make only limited affirmative
action efforts. In setting a high standard for a plaintiff who is challeng-
ing a program set up for his own benefit, the Fourth Circuit in Wright
recognized the need to allow employers flexibility in their special train-
ing programs and the need to encourage affirmative action programs.
A. KIRKLAND MOLLOY
D. Statistical Evidence in Title VII Litigation
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII) is
to promote equal employment opportunities by removing artificial bar-
quirement to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. In Dothard,
Title VII plaintiffs offered statistical evidence of the relative capacities of men and women
to satisfy a statutorily-imposed height and weight requirement. 433 U.S. at 329-30. The
Dothard Court rejected the defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs' statistics did not con-
cern actual job applicants by stating that a statistical showing of disparate impact need not
necessarily be based on an analysis of characteristics of actual applicants. Id. at 330.
" 440 U.S. at 585-87.
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978); text accompanying
notes 37-40 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971).
609 F.2d at 718.
"I&
Id.; see text accompanying notes 24-26 & 37-40 supra.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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riers that have favored one group of employees over another.2 Title VII
proscribes intentionally discriminatory acts3 as well as facially neutral
policies that adversely affect a protected group.4 Plaintiffs may establish
Title VII employment discrimination claims under either a disparate
treatment theory outlined by the United States Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,5 or a disparate impact theory as set
out by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' To establish disparate
I See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Sections 703(a)(1) and (2)
of Title VII prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin in both public and private employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2) (1976). Under
§ 701(b) Title VII only applies to employers who are engaged in industry affecting commerce
and who employ at least fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
To proceed under Title VII, a private plaintiff must file an administrative claim of dis-
crimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days*
of the alleged discriminatory event for evaluation and attempted conciliation by the EEOC.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
Thereafter, the plaintiff may not sue under Title VII unless the EEOC notifies him of a right
to sue. See Local 179, United Textile Wkrs. v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 851
(8th Cir. 1972). As a result of its own investigation, the EEOC may issue notice of the right
to sue after dismissing the administrative charge, terminating conciliation discussions with
the defendant, or failing to bring suit within 180 days of the filing of the charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Upon receipt of notice of the right to sue, the plaintiff has 90 days within
which to bring suit in federal district court. Id.; see Sape & Hart, Title VIIReconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 862-64 (1972).
Plaintiffs may also seek redress for racial discrimination in public and private employ-
ment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 135, 140 (E.D.
Mich. 1972), modified on other grounds, 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). Section 1981 confers on
all persons within the United States equal rights to make and enforce contracts. Plaintiffs
claiming under § 1981, or both § 1981 and Title VII, may avoid the delay-ridden EEOC ad-
ministrative procedures. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461
(1975).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); note 5 infra.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); note 6 infra. Groups tradi-
tionally "protected" by Title VII include racial, religious, and ethnic minorities as well as
women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Although in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized that the prima facie test for disparate treat-
ment is flexible, id. at 802 n.13, the classic formulation of the prima facie test includes
minority status as one of its elements. Id. at 802. Title VII, however, applies to all
employees, including white males. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 279 (1976). Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, Title VII assumes that all indi-
viduals qualify equally for all jobs. See Copus, The Numbers Game Is The Only Game In
Town, 20 How. L.J. 374, 383 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Copus].
' 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Disparate treatment is a theory of discrimination for which the
United States Supreme Court promulgated a tripartite proof standard in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green. Id. at 802-04; see note 7 infra. In contrast to the disparate impact
theory, see note 6 infra, a plaintiff using the disparate treatment theory must prove dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the employer. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977). The disparate treatment plaintiff, however, can establish a prima facie
case without showing discriminatory intent. See 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
§ 50.10 (1980).
' 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact is a theory of discrimination promulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. Id. at 431-33; see note 8 infra.
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treatment, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
employer. 7 To establish disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that an
employer has engaged in practices that have a disproportionate impact
on a protected group and are not justified by business necessity!
Congress was aware that employment discrimination is an institutionalized class problem
and is therefore more likely to result from widespread practices than from isolated events
or intentional wrongs. See S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5; S. REP. No. 91-1137,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4. Prior to Griggs, Title VII plaintiffs faced the formidable task of prov-
ing discriminatory intent. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and The Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 70 (1972). The
disparate impact test, however, has enabled courts to recognize Title VII violations which
were formerly unprovable. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977)
(disparate impact of minimum height and weight requirements); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of
Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (disparate impact of employee discharge for wage
garnishment).
' To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff must show that he was a member of a racial minority, that he sought a promo-
tion offered by his employer to a position for which he was qualified, that his employer re-
jected him despite his qualifications, and that after his rejection the position remained
available to others with comparable qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas
Court noted that the prima facie proof requirement will vary according to differing fact pat-
terns in Title VII cases. Id. at 802 n.13. After the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to rebut the prima facie case by articulating legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its action. Id. at 802. If the defendant employer is successful, the
plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the defendant's allegedly nondiscriminatory rea-
sons are only a "pretext" shielding actual discriminatory intent. Id. at 804. See also Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978). Once the plaintiff brings the defendant's
motivation into issue, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion with regard to the defend-
ant's intentional discrimination. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per
curiam).
I To prove discriminatory employment practices under the Griggs test, a plaintiff
must establish that a facially neutral employment policy or practice disproportionately bur-
dens the claimant's protected group. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 74.10 (1980). Without identifying any
particular policy or practice, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
on the basis of statistical evidence that a protected group is grossly underrepresented in a
particular group of employees or in a specific job classification. See Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). Usually, proof of a disparate impact claim en-
tails a three-step analysis. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff first
must demonstrate that an employment practice effectively denies equal employment oppor-
tunities to members of a protected class. Id.; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971). The disparate impact test is not applicable to an individual instance of discrimination
even though the discrimination may be directly traceable to a particular employment prac-
tice. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). To make a valid disparate impact claim, a plaintiff
must establish a pattern or practice of discrimination by the employer. See 401 U.S. at
430-32; Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1979).
The plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination is rebuttable by the defendant's
showing that the allegedly discriminatory employment practices are job related. See 433
U.S. at 329; 401 U.S. at 431. The Fourth Circuit considers an employment practice to be "job
related" if the employer demonstrates that the practice effectuates efficient operation of
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Disparate impact claims generally do not require the plaintiff to prove
specific discriminatory intent.9
Private actions as well as Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) pattern and practice"0 suits often stem from widespread in-
stitutionalized discrimination.1 Since institutionalized practices account
for most discrimination, statistics are an essential form of evidence in
proving discrimination.'2 The United States Supreme Court has approved
the use of statistical evidence in both disparate treatment 3 and
the business. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The employer may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie showing by
demonstrating that the business purpose overrides any racial impact and that there are no
less discriminatory practices available to accomplish the stated purpose. Id.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff may ultimately establish liability by demonstrating
alternative methods by which the defendant could advance its legitimate business interests
without disproportionately affecting the plaintiff's protected class. See 433 U.S. at 329; 422
U.S. at 425.
See note 6 supra.
,0 The federal government is the plaintiff in a pattern or practice suit. See Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6(a) and (c) (1976). The Govern-
ment's initial burden in a pattern and practice suit is to demonstrate that an employer has
unlawfully discriminated as a regular practice or policy. 431 U.S. at 360. The Government's
burden at the liability stage is merely to establish a prima facie case that a discriminatory
policy existed. Id.; see note 8 supra.
The employer has the burden to defeat the Government's prima facie showing of a
discriminatory pattern or practice. Id.; see notes 5 & 6 supra. Should the employer fail to
rebut the inference of discrimination arising from the Government's prima facie case, a
court's finding of a discriminatory pattern or practice justifies an award of relief to the
plaintiff. 431 U.S. at 361. The question of individual relief does not arise until the remedial
stage of the trial. Id. Individual discriminatees may then rely on the inference that the
employer made employment decisions, during the effective time of the discriminatory
policy, in pursuit of that policy. Id. at 362.
" See Copus, supra note 4, at 376.
2 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306-09 (1977) (use of sta-
tistics to find a pattern or practice of employment discrimination); Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) (use of statistics an important source of proof of employ-
ment discrimination); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (with regard to institutionalized discrimination, "statistics often
tell much, and courts listen"); Copus, supra note 4, at 378-82.
Title VII statistical comparisons under both the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories are either comparative or demographic. See Note, Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment: The Prima Facie Case Under Title VII, 32 ARK. L. REv. 571, 578
(1978). "Applicant flow data" are comparative statistics that refer to actual participants in
the employment process. Id. Demographic statistics refer to more general population data
in the relevant labor force. Id. Comparative statistics may sway courts on the disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment issues because an employer cannot manipulate -these
statistics. See Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title
VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463, 469 (1973). See also EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1977) (manipulation of statistics to prove impact or non--
impact).
"I See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977). See also Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978); note 28 infra.
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disparate impact cases.14 In United States v. County of Fairfax,
Virginia5 and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United
Virginia Bank/Seaboard National,"6 the Fourth Circuit reviewed the role
of statistical evidence in a plaintiff's case under Title VII. In Fairfax the
court outlined the role of statistics in establishing a plaintiff's prima
facie case of disparate treatment, and in United Virginia the court deter-
mined what type of statistical evidence is probative in disparate impact
cases.
In Fairfax, the United States advanced both disparate impact 7 and
disparate treatment arguments alleging that the County of Fairfax,
Virginia had discriminated against blacks and women in recruitment,
hiring, assignments, and promotions." To establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment, the United States offered statistics to show that
the number of blacks and women employed by the county was dispropor-
tionately low compared to the number of blacks and women in the
available labor market. 9 The United States presented statistical data for
the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
proving significant disparities on the basis of 1970 census and 1974
Department of Labor information."0 In addition, the United States pro-
duced applicant flow data showing the race and sex of all applicants for
county employment and compared that data to the composition of the
county's work force.2
In response to the disparate treatment claim, the county offered a
statistical analysis as well as proof of its 1978 affirmative action plan.'
" See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
II 629 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981).
615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
17 The United States produced evidence at trial that the county's practice of using un-
validated tests to screen applicants had a disparate impact on blacks and women. 629 F.2d
at 936-37. The district court did not, however, consider the disparate impact issue. Id. In
view of the many unresolved factual aspects of the disparate impact case, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the district court judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 943.
18 Id. at 936-37.
Id. A prima facie case of disparate treatment would shift the burden to the county to
rebut the Government's inference of intentional racial and sexual employment discrimina-
tion practices. Id.; see note 5 supra.
629 F.2d at 936-37. The county's work force was 7.5% black and 26.4/0 female and
the SMSA labor pool, as measured by the 1970 census, was 24% black and 40.4% female. Id.
at 937.
" Id. Experts testified that, for numerous job classifications, the percentages of blacks
and women hired in 1978 were significantly lower than the percentages of blacks and
women in the 1978 applicant pool. Id. The Government demonstrated that blacks and
women were concentrated in lower-paying and less desirable job classifications including
service, maintenance, office, and clerical positions. Id. The Government also showed isolated
instances of actual race and sex discrimination by certain county departments. Id.
' Id. at 937. Unfortunately, the county had destroyed pre-1978 applications for the af-
firmative action program and could not verify the effectiveness of its 1978 affirmative action
plan in comparison to pre-1978 recruitment efforts. Id. at 937-38.
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The county based the percentage of available blacks and women in the
geographic vicinity on a zip code analysis of job applicants in 1 9 7 8 .1 The
district court rejected the United States' statistical data and evaluated
the discrimination claim on the basis on the county's zip code analysis.2 4
Although the zip code analysis revealed that the county had discrimi-
nated against blacks in 1976 and 1977, the district court concluded that
the county's affirmative action program precluded the necessity for
equitable relief to correct racial discrimination. 5 The district court, how-
ever, enjoined future sex discrimination as a result of discrimination by
the county against women in one job category.28 Both the United States
and the county appealed from the district court judgment.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue whether the
United States' or the county's statistical evidence was more probative
on the disparate treatment discrimination claim.' The Fourth Circuit
I Id. at 937. On the basis of the zip codes of 1978 job applicants, the county determined
the percentage of applicants from six selected geographical areas including Northern
Virginia, the District of Columbia, suburban Maryland, the Mid-Atlantic States, New York/
Pennsylvania/Delaware, and the remainder of the United States. Id. Using 1970 census
figures, the county determined by race and sex the number of employed and experienced
unemployed persons from each of the six geographic areas and then computed the percent-
ages of available blacks and women in each employment category for each area. Id. Com-
parison of actual hires from 1974-78 to the available labor market showed significant dispari-
ties with respect to blacks in only two job categories and with respect to women in only one
job category. Id.




Id. at 936-37. Although statistics may be used in disparate treatment cases, see note
13 supra, the proper role of statistical evidence in disparate treatment claims is unclear. At
least one circuit has rejected a plaintiffs use of statistical evidence alone to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment. See Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d
409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975) (statistical evidence not determinative of employer's reasons for ac-
tions against individual employee). Other circuits have accepted statistical evidence of in-
dividual employment discrimination that was supported by other evidence indicating
discrimination. See Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and
Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975) (in addition to evidence
of specific discriminatory acts, plaintiff produced evidence of qualified females in the area);
Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975) (selection standards for promotion were vague and subjective). The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has held that statistical evidence alone established a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1979). A problem
with the Davis decision, however, is the D.C. Circuit's analytical shift from disparate treat-
ment analysis to disparate impact analysis. See id. at 962-63.
Although the circuits are divided with regard to the use of statistics for establishing a
prima facie case in an individual action, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), indicates that a plaintiff cannot rely on
statistics alone. Id. at 579-80. In Furnco, the Court held that the statistical evidence was in-
sufficient to demonstrate conclusively that the employer's actions were discriminatorily
motivated. Id. The Furnco Court indicated, however, that the lower court could consider the
racial mix of the work force in trying to evaluate the employer's motivation. Id.
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rejected the county's zip code data.2 Although the Fourth Circuit also
rejected the United States' SMSA statistics,0 the court held that the
United States' applicant flow data was probative on the issue of dis-
crimination." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the applicant flow data
provided the most accurate estimation of the county's labor market
because the flow data reflected the actual participants in the county's
employment process.2 The Fourth Circuit indicated that the county's
analysis of the available labor market was incomplete and misleading.3
The county had understated the available number of minority members
by including only employed and experienced unemployed blacks and
women in its statistics.' The court noted that the distortion was espe-
cially significant since many of the county's entry level jobs required no
prior experience.3 5
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the United States' applicant
flow data provided the appropriate measure of Fairfax County's 1974-78
labor market is consistent with recent United States Supreme Court
decisions. 6 The Supreme Court has indicated that general population
statistics may not be probative on the issue of an employer's discrimina-
In Fairfax, the Fourth Circuit accepted statistical evidence of a substantial racial and
sexual imbalance in the county's work force as a sign of purposeful discrimination. 629 F.2d
at 938. Although the court noted that disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory
intent, see note 5 supra, the court held that statistics alone could establish a prima facie
case without specific proof of overt discrimination. Id. The Fourth Circuit previously has
held statistical data sufficient to demonstrate intentional discrimination. See Barnett v.
W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the Fairfax court emphasized
the need to examine patterns, practices, and general employment policies in addition to
statistics. Id.
629 F.2d at 941.
" See text accompanying note 20 supra. The Fourth Circuit rejected the SMSA
statistics because the differences in wage rates and geographical distance between the county
and District of Columbia were sufficient to create two separate and distinct labor markets.
629 F.2d at 939-40. The Government therefore could not properly rely on the substantial
black population in the District of Columbia to raise the percentage of blacks in the SMSA
statistics. Id.
SI Id. at 941.
Id. at 940. The Fourth Circuit noted that applicant data is generally highly probative
evidence of an employer's labor market. Id.; see Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
629 F.2d at 941.
34 Id.
35 Id.
I See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 400 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (statistical
showing inadequate to demonstrate that Transit Authority's regulation prohibiting nar-
cotics use by employees was effectively racially discriminatory); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (proper statistical comparison was between racial
composition of school teaching staff and racial composition of the qualified public school
teacher population in the relevant labor market). See generally Hay, The Use of Statistics
to Disprove Employment Discrimination, 29 LAB. L.J. 430 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hay].
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tory hiring and promotion practices for skilled positions." Since Con-
gress intended Title VII to insure fair treatment of all employees, and
not to redistribute jobs, a plaintiffs statistics should include only those
individuals who are qualified for the disputed positions. 8 Statistics based
on a qualified labor market are a more accurate indication of employ-
ment discrimination than mere general population statistical disparities
that are not the result of discrimination. 9
Fairfax demonstrates that in disparate treatment cases, statistical
evidence is less probative because the plaintiff must show that the
employer acted with discriminatory intent."0 In disparate impact cases,
however, statistical evidence is highly probative because the plaintiff
must show only the actual discriminatory consequences of an employ-
ment practice." In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National, the Fourth Circuit refined the
standards for determining when statistical evidence is probative in
disparate impact cases. In United Virginia, the EEOC brought a pattern
and practice suit" against United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National
(UVB) alleging discriminatory hiring procedures against black appli-
cants.' 3
The EEOC proffered a statistical comparison of black employees at
UVB with blacks in the local labor force to substantiate the disparate im-
pact claim." On remand from the Fourth Circuit for more detailed find-
The Supreme Court has required that labor market statistics include only those indi-
viduals who are qualified to fill the disputed positions. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (reliance on "qualified labor market" concept). See also Hay,
supra note 36, at 436.
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) (Title VII does not
impose duty to maximize minority hiring); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977) (Title VII does not require racially balanced work force); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (since race, religion, national origin, and sex are irrelevant,
Congress made job qualifications controlling factor).
See Hay, supra note 36, at 440.
'o See W. CONNOLLY & D. PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY LITIGATION 16-17 (1980).
4 Id. at 17; see note 6 supra.
2 See note 4 supra.
'3 615 F.2d at 148-49. The EEOC's suit included a claim that UVB had discriminated
against black applicants by requiring a high school education and a preemployment credit
check. Id. at 149. On remand from the Fourth Circuit for more detailed findings of fact, the
district court held that the EEOC had failed to establish either that UVB had a minimal
high school education requirement or that such a requirement had a disparate impact on
blacks. EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, [1977] 21 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 1392,
1402. The court further held that the fiduciary nature of the banking business would permit
credit checks of prospective employees as a legitimate business device so long as UVB con-
ducted checks regardless of race. Id. at 1402-03. The EEOC did not appeal from the district
court's holdings on the high school education and credit check requirements. 615 F.2d at
149.
" 615 F.2d at 149.
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ings of fact, the district court held that the EEOC's statistical evidence
established a prima facie case of discrimination by UVB against blacks."
The district court concluded, however, that UVB had not discriminated
against any employee or in any employment practice and also commended
UVB's affirmative action program.46 The court held that UVB had re-
butted the presumption of racial discrimination raised by the EEOC sta-
tistics.1
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed on different grounds.48 The
Fourth Circuit held that the EEOC's statistical comparisons failed to
establish a prima facie case of hiring discrimination.49 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the EEOC's statistical evidence was not probative
because the figures did not exclude pre-Title VII hires" and because the
figures represented the total number of blacks in the population area
rather than the number of blacks in the work force qualified to work for
UVB.5 1 In addition, the court held that the EEOC's statistics represented
an insufficient statistical sample because the statistical comparisons
were based on insufficient samples.2
United Virginia is consistent with a recent United States Supreme
Court decision that increased the standard for the admission of statis-
tical proof in a Title VII disparate impact case. The Supreme Court
,5 21 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. at 1395.
46 Id. at 1404.
' Id. at 1402-03.
'8 615 F.2d at 148-53, 154 n.3.
'9 Id. at 156.
Id. at 150. The United Virginia court held that the EEOC's failure to exclude
employees hired prior to the effective date of Title VII (July 2, 1965) from the statistical
evidence improperly weighted the figures against UVB because the statistics included
white employees hired prior to Title VII. Id. The Supreme Court has held that an employee
who has made wholly non-discriminatory employment decisions does not violate Title VII by
having intentionally excluded blacks from an all-white work force prior to the enactment of
Title VII. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1976).
" 615 F.2d at 154. The Fourth Circuit noted that a statistical comparison between the
UVB work force and the qualified regional work force would be probative evidence on the
issue of employment discrimination by UVB. Id. at 149.
1 Id. at 153; see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977) (statistical
comparisons from insufficient samples improper).
' See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-87 (1979). The Beazer
Court held that statistical evidence may establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. Id. at
584. Statistics are not, however, irrefutable, and the plaintiffs' general population statistics
in Beazer failed to prove a Title VII violation. Id. The Court rejected one set of statistics
for failing to describe employees actually dismissed as a result of the Transit Authority's
drug policy. Id. at 585. The Court held a second set of statistics to be overinclusive for in-
cluding more than just the relevant class of applicants and employees receiving methadone
treatment. Id. at 585-86.
The Beazer Court did not distinguish either Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971), or Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), from its shift in statistical evidence
analysis in disparate impact cases. The Griggs plaintiffs used general population statistics
to compare the percentage of blacks and whites who failed to satisfy an employer's facially
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held that plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact on the basis of general population statistics.-4 Instead, the Court
held that a plaintiff must produce applicant flow data to demonstrate the
policy's impact on actual applicants.55
The United Virginia court's refusal to hold that the EEOC had estab-
lished a prima facie case of employment discrimination is also consistent
with prior Fourth Circuit decisions in the area of employment discrimi-
nation56 as well as the purpose of Title VII.57 In United Virginia, all
blacks in the local labor force were not qualified for all of the bank's
available jobs." The Fourth Circuit stressed that the EEOC had not pro-
duced any evidence regarding the relative numbers of blacks and whites
qualified for the jobs at UVB. 5 Nor had the EEOC produced evidence,
out of thousands of employee records, of a single applicant qualified for a
managerial position who was denied employment.5 Congress did not in-
tend Title VII to guarantee every person a job irrespective of the in-
dividual's qualifications or to require an employer to hire an applicant
solely because the applicant is a member of a minority group." In Title
VII Congress sought to eliminate discriminatory preferences for any
group, minority or majority, by removing artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers to employment.2 The United Virginia decision is con-
sistent with the congressional objectives.
Fairfax and United Virginia exemplify the growing role of statisical
evidence in Title VII litigation. In both Fairfax and United Virginia, the
Fourth Circuit emphasized that applicant flow data was the most ac-
neutral high school diploma requirement to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact. 401
U.S. at 430 n.6. In Dothard, the Title VII plaintiffs offered statistical evidence of the
relative capacities of men and women to satisfy a statutorily-imposed height and weight re-
quirement. 433 U.S. at 329-30. The Dothard Court rejected the defendants' assertion that
the plaintiffs' statistics did not concern actual job applicants by noting that a statistical
showing of disparate impact need not be based on an analysis of characteristics of actual ap-
plicants. Id.
See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979); note 53 supra.
440 U.S. at 585-86.
The Fourth Circuit has emphasized the necessity for statistical evidence designed to
show disparities to adapt fairly to actual labor pools and work categories. See, e.g., Stastny
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 78-1361, slip op. at 17 (4th Cir. July 28, 1980); EEOC v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 1979); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343,
1349-50 (4th Cir. 1976).
IT See text accompanying notes 61-62 infra.
615 F.2d at 149, 154.
Id. at 154.
OId.
'l See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
Id. Since the purpose of Title VII was to insure that men and women be employed
strictly on the basis of their qualifications, Congress considered making an employer's use
of race as a criterion for employment of applicants an illegal practice. See 110 CONG. REC.
13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1975).
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